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Abstract
In studying topics in cyber conflict and cyber-security governance, scholars must ask—arguably more so than has been the
casewith any other emergent research agenda—where the epistemological and ontological value of differentmethods lies.
This article describes the unique, dual methodological challenges inherent in the multifaceted program on global cyber-
security and asks how problematic they are for scholarly efforts to construct knowledge about digital dynamics in world
affairs. I argue that any answer to this question will vary depending on how one perceives the social science enterprise.
While traditional dualistic perspectives on social science imply unique challenges for researcher, a monistic perspective
of Weberian objectivity does not. Regardless of one’s perspective, however, the most important steps to be taken at the
level of the research program are clearly those focused on constructing the trappings of community. To this end, I outline
steps that might be taken to develop a range of community-building and -supporting mechanisms that can simultaneously
support a micro-foundational approach to research and expose community elements to one another. Doing this stands to
better opportunities for the production of knowledge and direct researchers towards fruitful avenues whilst shortening
gaps between the ivory tower and the real world.
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1. Introduction
For almost half a century, new information and commu-
nications technologies (ICT) based on packet-switching
and related network-oriented design features have
worked to rewire the international system. The digitiza-
tion of global infrastructure has transformed the consti-
tution of global commerce, social connections and secu-
rity relationships alike. Given the scope of the impact
of this most recent information revolution, it seems rea-
sonable to assert that cyber-security—i.e. the security of
socio-technical systems and, more specifically, practices
involved therein—is, thus, a policy field aimed at more
than only technical, organizational or national security.
Wherever ICT undergird societal functions, questions of
cyber-security abound. And, since ICT have also augured
unique changes to the global information environment,
cyber-security analyses and prescriptions must necessar-
ily consider the broader intersection of technology and
the normative fabric of world affairs. In short, the scope
of the scholarly research program on cyber-security gov-
ernance, conflict and economics is immense.
And yet, the broad field of cyber issues studies faces
unprecedented foundational challenges with respect to
the construction of new knowledge. Specifically, and per-
haps moreso than has been the case with any other
emergent research agendas in recent history, scholars
studying cyber matters must consistently grapple with
distinct epistemological and ontological questions. Given
the inherent difficulties in obtaining data and validating
observational inferences, how can we presume to know
what we think we know? If the link between our empir-
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ical resources and inferred findings is open to question,
how can we be sure that the phenomena and dynamic
forces we study are as we see them? All social scien-
tists must confront such issues in their approach to un-
derstanding the world around them and, from Hutchins
(1995) seminal work on cognition to Mindell’s (2002)
cybernetics exploration of interacting control systems,
there exists a rich literature on both the challenges and
value proposition inherent in studying the interaction of
technology and human systems.
But with cyber-security issues the potential obstacles
are uniquely pronounced.While it is certainly possible to
study, for instance, traditional questions of bureaucracy
and politicking around Internet-oriented bodies without
considering technological variables, a great deal of work
is inevitably aimed at assessing technology as it supports,
impacts and enables kinetic human interactions. As such,
a substantial element of the academy in this area must
attempt to link technological empirical foundations with
socio-physical outcomes.
This article asks how problematic core methodologi-
cal challenges commonly identified by cyber-security re-
searchers really are and describes steps that might be
made to improve prospects for knowledge construction
at the level of the research program. Over and above
environmental problems in obtaining data, the cyber-
security research program suffers from acute attribu-
tional challenges. To date, scholars employing data ob-
tained through public-sphere observation or in collabo-
ration with technology vendors have taken one of two
approaches to data collection, with scope conditions be-
ing set by either socio-kinetic or technical system details.
Though both approaches are promising, the basis of each
suggests inherent challenges in cross-validating results
and building macro theory. It is often extremely hard to
attribute digital patterns to sociopolitical wherewithal;
likewise, inquiry that selects on specific actors in world
politics is often unable to capture the scope of covert
digital actions. In essence, though existing research cer-
tainly stands to contribute to the body of knowledge on
cyber politics and cyber-security governance, contradic-
tory bases for investigation combine with the domain’s
unique attribution challenges to make analysis of so-
ciopolitical phenomena systematically difficult.
The challenges before the multi-faceted cyber re-
search program are not new and are novel only insofar
as ICT regularly produce a disconnect between domain-
specific actions or outcomes and realworld ones. In truth,
the question of methodological approach to cyber issues
is one of reconciling existing perspectives with advancing
work in such a way as to develop a scientifically healthy
research program. In the sections below, I describe com-
peting perspectives on the ability of social science ap-
proaches to build a body of knowledge that impartially
describes the real world. I point out that while dominant
dualistic perspectives on social science suggest that at-
tribution challenges for empirical work in the cyber field
are severe, a monistic interpretation of the social sci-
ence enterprise implies they are problematic only inso-
far as scholars should ideally be able to gauge the shape
of all elements of the real world for purposes of form-
ing impressions. I then argue that, regardless of the per-
spective one adopts, scholars in the burgeoning cyber-
security research program should take steps to develop
a range of community-building and -supporting mech-
anisms that can simultaneously support a coordinated
micro-foundational approach to knowledge construction
and expose community elements to one another. The
sections below outline the case for this in greater detail
and make a series of specific recommendations.
The remainder of this article proceeds in five parts.
First, it considers the nature and aimsof the cyber-security
research program within the social sciences. Then, it
briefly discusses competing philosophical perspectives on
the constitution of knowledge in research on the world
around us and fleshes out unique, dual attributional prob-
lems that many researchers must inevitably face in ef-
forts to link technical foundations to socio-physical con-
text. Thirdly, the article discusses open source research
in the broader program of investigation and adjudicates
on the degree to which unique attributional problems
matter. Finally, it argues that, regardless of one’s per-
spective on the nature of the social science enterprise,
a community-oriented organization of research efforts is
critical for efforts to construct macro theory and generate
meaningful inference. Here, I make specific suggestions at
the level of the research program, before concluding.
2. The Shape and Focus of Digital Studies Research
Cyber studies constitute an immensely broad field of in-
vestigation. This is a necessary condition because of the
unique foundational feature of the network technologies
that lie at the heart of the field. Simply put, changes
to global society in this most recent information revolu-
tion have emerged from a multiform application of new
design features to the full range of societal infrastruc-
ture. Information technology is crosscutting to such a
degree that it is the rare social, political or economic
issue that has not been impacted. As such, cyber stud-
ies possess an incredible broad substantive remit. At the
highest level, we might consider this remit to include
the dynamics of technology adoption across global so-
ciety (Choucri, 2012), the role of governments in prob-
lematizing andmeeting cyber challenges (see among oth-
ers, Knake, 2010; Nye, 2014; Stevens, 2017), the resul-
tant management of international security and the fun-
damental institutional, technological and societal prereq-
uisites of security.
Though it might otherwise do to categorize the cyber
studies research program into different academic areas
of focus, from global cyber-security governance (Chou-
cri, Madnick, & Ferwerda, 2014) and cyber conflict mech-
anisms (see among others, Buchanan, 2017; Gartzke &
Lindsay, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 2015) to the orga-
nization of social movements in virtual spaces (for in-
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stance, Beyer, 2014) and the cutting edge of ICT devel-
opment, the fact of the matter is that methodological
issues and imperatives in this vein emerge from a sim-
ple proposition—that the most recent information revo-
lution has fundamentally altered not only the nature of
human interactions on a global scale, but also the con-
stitution (i.e. the context) thereof. If this proposition is
accurate or even accepted in part, then the field’s re-
mit is truly unique. Different from research sub-programs
across the social sciences that study specific tools of hu-
man interaction, the study of world politics as couched
in the context of ICT adoption and integration is the in-
vestigation of transformed environmental conditions on
a global scale. Though man-made, the evolving digitiza-
tion of global infrastructure presents as both an exoge-
nous determinant of human interconnections and an en-
dogenous modifier of specific relationships.
It would not do here to go on without recognizing
that there exists a rich and well-trodden literature on
the interaction of human institutions and the tools they
employ. Nestled in the field of science and technology
studies, research on cybernetics has for many decades
described the manner in which technology is not sim-
ply a material feature of the world that humans engage
with in the course of our actions (see among others, Min-
dell, 2002; Mindell, Segal, & Gerovitch, 2003; Wiener,
1961, 1988). Rather, technology is a tangible variable
that both shapes human agency and determines the nor-
mative context of human interactions (Hutchins, 1995).
What’s unique about themost recent information revolu-
tion is the twofoldmanner inwhich new ICT both provide
for human interaction substantially detached from real
world context and do so systematically at the global level.
Thus, while literature that takes reference from work on
cybernetics, social network theories andmore is relevant
to the research program on cyber-security—and, indeed,
has recently been the focus of a handful of unique contri-
butions to the field—the methodological challenges fac-
ing scholars today is of unique scale.
The result of such a dynamic is reasonably clear.
Though, again, it is possible to study cyber effects with-
out looking beyond what some have called the “real-
kinetic” empirical dynamics of world affairs (Choucri,
2012), much of the broad-scoped cyber studies research
program will enduringly be required to look at the inter-
section of specific ICT usage, implementation dynamics
and resultant human behavior. In reference to a well-
developed program of study on the nature of power
and position in international relations (Barnett & Duvall,
2005), it seems reasonable to bound such work in two
ways. First, much cyber-security research aims to under-
stand how ICT play a role in augmenting human interac-
tions of various kinds. Some, for instance, has attempted
to map out the shift in how humans and human institu-
tions problem-solve given today’s global network-centric
environment (see among others, Amoore, 2009; Dreyfus,
2008; Galloway & Thacker, 2007; Shaviro, 2003). Here,
researchers are already grappling with the challenge of
matching data on the use of ICT with a range of sociopo-
litical outcomes. And again, as is broached further be-
low, there exists in cybernetics scholarship a nuanced
basis for examining closed systems of technology incor-
porated into human structures. Second, yet other work
aims to understand how ICTmight act to alter—either di-
rectly or reflexively through societal reactions to the in-
formation revolution—the context of those interactions.
Here, a range of research sub-programs in the psychol-
ogy, biology, business and sociology fields has emerged
to assess the manner in which the most recent informa-
tion revolution has fundamentally changed patterns of
human behavior. In both cases, the need to link informa-
tion on direct human interactions with ICT to related out-
comes is clear. Across the board, however, this impera-
tive presents as a unique challenge wherein attribution
of digital actions to various kinds of outcomes is not only
difficult methodologically, but fundamentally linked with
scholars’ ability to infer.
3. The Digital Divide: With Cyber Research, How Do
We KnowWhat We Know?
When it comes to linking human behavior enabled via
use of ICT, there are two distinct challenges for the re-
searcher. One of these is technical, the other preferen-
tial. The first is that links between digital realities and hu-
man actions are tenuous. Whether the subject of focus
is patterns of cryptocurrency usage (Sat, Krylov, Evgenye-
vich, Kasatkin, & Kornev, 2016) or the attribution of cyber
attacks (Rid & Buchanan, 2015), tying evidence of digi-
tal behavior to human input is difficult. The second chal-
lenge is that resources necessary for doing so are often
hidden behind not only technical barriers, but also socio-
institutional ones.
With regards to attribution of cyber activities, much
has been written across both the technical and social sci-
ences. For the purposes of social scientists, it is enough
to say that attribution of digital actions can be immensely
challenging simply because of the layered manner in
which relative ease in masking digital signatures meshes
with the additional difficulties involved in linking virtual
actions to human behavior (Guitton & Korzak, 2013).
Technical attribution—i.e. the linking of cyber actions
with indicators of action instigated by humans or human-
programmed systems—is not dichotomous. It would be
disingenuous to say that a measure of technical attribu-
tion of digital actions either does or does not point the
finger at specific causes of disruption or compromise. At-
tribution short of linking ICT usage to human agency runs
the full gamut from technical abilities to convince inves-
tigators of a given pattern of action to the much rarer
ability to lay out a case that an informed public audience
would be hard pressed to argue with (Geers, 2010). This
is made yet more problematic given that opponents are
not unitary. As Rid and Buchanan (2015) point out in their
discussion of Moonlight Maze as an example, efforts to
confirm attribution evidence pointing to Russian security
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 2, Pages 73–82 75
services ran into the problem of a clear compartmental-
ization of knowledge of offensive operations within the
Russian government. Some operators knew about the ex-
pansive espionage campaign; many did not.
And yet, when it comes to attribution of digital ac-
tions, technical demonstration of the origination thereof
is just part of the challenge. Indeed, it is arguably the
lesser part of the challenge. Even where data is made
available wherein technical attribution is possible to a
high degree of certainty, there inevitably exist additional
certitude problems for any scholar or analyst attempting
to link digital actions to sociopolitical ones. For scholars,
such intelligence gathering as a component part of cy-
ber research is particularly challenging, as wemust often
trust (given a certain ability to control for uncertainty)
the nature of information that attributes particular ac-
tions to actors. This naturally speaks to a higher-level
problem with the attribution of digital dynamics to real-
kinetic ones such that research on the broad gamut of
digital issues are facedwith unique ontological problems,
namely that sources and providers of relevant informa-
tion suffer from a broad range of measurement and reli-
ability problems.
In research on cyber conflict, in particular, it is ap-
parent to a broad range of scholars that barriers across
which lie the ability to generalize about digital actions
are more opaque than they are with traditional areas
of security work (see among others, Kello, 2013; Rid &
Buchanan, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 2014). The na-
ture of global network infrastructure as being substan-
tially privately owned means that access to Internet traf-
fic data and innumerable related metrics is hidden be-
hind preferential access walls. In essence, robust anal-
ysis is difficult for those operating in the public sphere
because we must contend with the incentives that both
private industry and government operators have to ei-
ther not report or misrepresent what they know about
the digital domain. Private firms must consider their rep-
utation, their standing with stakeholders, the value of
their intellectual property and a maze of compliance re-
quirements when deciding how to report information
andwhether or not to share datawith academics and the
public (Byres & Lowe, 2004; Sgouras, Birda, & Labridis,
2014). Moreover, operators willing to share relevant
data for use in research often enforce rules about how
data can be used (to enhance their public standing, for in-
stance) and government sub-organizations inevitably fa-
vor intelligence and defense community research in their
decision-making. What topics of interest do not suffer
from this issue—such as the use of ICT by activists for in-
herently public-facing efforts (see, for instance, Morozov,
2012; Shirky, 2008; Yang, 2009)—are virtually unique in
that observation of digital actions does not require inter-
action with a gatekeeper of some kind.
These dual challenges to research progress consti-
tute a digital divide wherein linking observation of digi-
tal dynamics to sociopolitical corollaries is systematically
difficult, both technically and logistically. Given these
foundational challenges with linking the growing base of
knowledge about a range of digital issues with actual pat-
terns of human interaction in the digital domain, howcan
scholars possibly know what we think we know (Jackson
& Nexon, 2013)? In particular, beyond the scope of indi-
vidual projects that find unique ways to obtain, validate
and employ data, how can an entire field of study act to
remedy the clear problem of socio-technical gatekeep-
ing that mires research—in the aggregate—in ontologi-
cal uncertainty?
4. How Problematic Are Such Challenges? The Dualist
and Monist Perspectives
To consider these questions, it is necessary to consider dif-
ferent philosophical perspectives on the nature of social
science and the development of effective research pro-
grams. Broadly, effective assessment of a research pro-
gram’s health and viability demands consideration of the
nature of the relationship between knowledge held and
assumed by scholars, on the one hand, and the empiri-
cal nature of the world around humans on the other. Do
our observations and subsequent inferences accurately
describe the real world? Or do they, since human con-
sciousness and operation is inherently a function of the
subjective way in which our minds view particular parts
of the world, lead to the development of a base of knowl-
edge that only makes sense in the context of human bi-
ases and interpretations? Recognizing these competing
perspectives and subsequent implications for the knowl-
edge generation process is critical for adjudicating on the
best paths that might help remedy the cyber-security re-
search program’s inherent ontological challenges.
To be clear, in the immense literature on the phi-
losophy of science (and particularly on the ontological
challenges of scholarly research), the questions posed
above in no way suggest some division between an ide-
alistic view of knowledge creation by researchers and a
more pragmatic one. The assertion that human stores of
knowledge do not accurately reflect the world around
us is simply a function of recognizing the role that
prior knowledge plays, in the form of biases and pre-
conditioned modes of problem solving, in shaping re-
search design and interpretation (see among others, Ben-
nett, 2013; Lake, 2011; Sil & Katzenstein, 2010). In assess-
ing a unique dynamic scientifically, researchers are invari-
ably prompted to addressmethods, practices and results
that the broader research community assess are adja-
cent to the current venture. And regardless of how ef-
fective a given research design is at preventing the intro-
duction of bias, interpretation of results and the subse-
quent task of placing new knowledge in the context of a
broader knowledge base inevitably prompts researchers
to interact with a broader construct (Habermas, 1987).
This is particularly the case given that interpretation of
results is rarely the task of individual researchers or inves-
tigative teams, but is inevitably at some point a task un-
dertaken by broader elements of a research community
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that need not observe scientific controls in their attempt
to consensually place new knowledge amongst the rest.
The result is a disconnected body of knowledge that only
represents the real world in the context of the practices
of those who developed that knowledge in the first place
(Jackson, 2008). This notion of the relationship between
empirics and human knowledge is called dualism.
By contrast, monism pushes back on the narrative
of dualism as reflecting an inevitable divergence in the
shape of the real world and human understanding of the
real world.Monism is the perspective that human knowl-
edge and the real-kinetic landscape of the world around
us are one and the same (Weber, 2017). This is not be-
cause advocates of monism reject the notion that bias
can infect and skew the results of the scientific enter-
prise. Rather, monists recognize that the parameters of
what humansmight understand about the world around
us is inherently a function of how we categorize “things”
in the world (Weber, 1904). Humans give meaning to
what we are studying by identifying them to begin with.
Thus, focusing purely on real-kinetic events, dynamics
and fundamentals in the world around us allows us to
understand both the “things” that we understand to be
in the world (i.e. the landscape of the world around us)
and the knowledge we hold about those things (Jackson,
2008). Whereas dualism holds that there is an objective
reality about the real world that is separate from human
knowledge of the world, monism holds that understand-
ing critical junctures and events via observation allows us
to understand the world in such a way that our body of
knowledge is essentially congruent with the condition of
the world.
The debate over the nature of the social science en-
terprise between monists and dualists has seen a range
of developments in recent years. Pushing back against
the correlative narrative of both classical and seminal du-
alists, in particular, a series of works (for instance, Ben-
nett, 2010) and conference publications (Mackay, 2007)
have organized around the concept of factual or specu-
lative materialism. Advocates of such thinking propose
that objects are not elements of “the real world” to be as-
sessed and characterized as one thing or another, but are
multi-factual constructs as potentially complex as human
beings (Bryant, Snricek, & Harman, 2011; Phetteplace,
2010). Thus, far from accepting the notion that inferen-
tial analysis cedes knowledge about a world in which hu-
mans operate, speculative materialists (or realists) join
others in conceptualizing systems wherein humans are
not unique as animate objects.
5. Dualism and Monism as Competing (Approaches to
the) Social Sciences
In a discussion of the ontological challenges faced by
the cyber-security research program,why shouldwe care
about competing philosophical perspectives on the na-
ture of the social science enterprise? Simply put, advo-
cacy of one or the other leads to a diverse set of pre-
scriptions on what kinds of scholarly activities are most
likely to build a useful, accurate and accessible store of
knowledge by the academy. The shape of such activi-
ties, in turn, suggests the degree to which the challenges
inherent in undertaking empirical work on many cyber-
security topics are problematic for the development of
the research program.
Dualist perspectives on the social sciences are, by
far, more commonplace than are monist ones. Though
most social science work from the mid-20th century on-
wards tends to self-describe as “positivist” (or variations
thereof) in nature, the reality is that most scholars re-
ject the notion that observation is synonymous with the
shape of the real world. Rather, most are dualists of one
kind of another that essentially seek to dispensewith the
character of their own perspectives in order to better un-
derstand empirically the environment in which humans
exist and interact. Again, thoughmost social scientists to-
day would likely identify as positivists, the better term
to use would, according to Jackson (2008), be neoposi-
tivists.1 Such scholars, divided as they are on a range of
philosophical points (see Blaug, 1975; Fuller, 2004; see
also Kuhn, 1970; Popper, 1970), nevertheless uniformly
reject the monism of positivism and agree to the central
importance of one particular scholarly activity as criti-
cal for the generation of knowledge that increasingly de-
scribes the real world accurately—falsification (Lakatos,
1976). Falsification, simply put, is the design of obser-
vational scientific procedures such that different hypo-
thetical suppositions can be rigorously tested and elim-
inated if certain conditions are not met. It is an activity
that, by definition, dictates the existence of a divide be-
tweenhuman activity in research practices and theworld
around us.
By contrast with prevailing dualist perspectives on
the social sciences, monist ones reject the entire notion
that what we see in the world around us is some kind
of neutral tapestry on which humans draw and from
which we take reference. As Jackson (2008) describes,
monism’s most well-known proponent—Max Weber—
argues that there can be no social science enterprise
without pre-defined and assumed socio-cultural under-
standing of what is actually under study (Weber, 1904).
Here, Weber addresses the most common criticism of
dualist—and particularly neopositivist—approaches to
research. Since neopositivism necessitates the dispen-
sation of human inputs to the observational process
through some form of falsification in research design,
it intrinsically demands some kind of agreed-upon stan-
dards of evidence and objectivity. In a comparative study,
this would manifest in one or several agreed-upon meth-
ods for operationalizing both the dependent and inde-
1 Though they are awarded singular focus in treatments of dualistic perspectives on the social science enterprise, neo-positivists are not alone in their
view of human knowledge and real world dynamics being inherently separate. Jackson (2008) describes both critical realists and “partisans of ‘commu-
nicative action’” (p. 130) as belonging in the dualist category.
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pendent variables. This, of course, is the greatest weak-
ness of dualism as social science. There is simply no way
that scholars can confirm the validity of a given hypothe-
sis, nomatter the amount of otherwise seemingly-robust
testing it endures, asmore correct in its representation of
the world around us (Hacking, 1999). Moreover, the re-
quirement that researchers pick some measurements of
the real world over others inherently weakens the falsifi-
cation process in some instances in that hypotheses may
constitute conventional wisdom or consensus positions
in its parts. Such hypotheses might survive in scholarship
because its construction is uncontroversial, regardless of
the shape of evidence brought to bear. The Democratic
Peace Theory is a paradigmatic example of such a hypoth-
esis wherein the component elements are (or at least
were for many years) broadly considered common sense
without further operationalization (see among others,
Layne, 1994; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Rosato, 2003).
The solution to such an inescapable inability to ever
perfectly, objectively describe the world around us, ac-
cording to a monist perspective on the social science en-
terprise, would be not to try. Rather than focus on accu-
rately describing the world around us as a set of facts,
scholars should assess ideal-type constructions of our
worldwith consistent analytic premises (Lindbekk, 1992).
These premises need not be free of bias in any way, but
simply must be consistent and logically applied across re-
search (Jackson, 2008). Such work is then judged to be
more or less meaningful to the broader body of human
knowledge given the degree to which is can successfully
persuade an audience of diverse persuasions. In other
words, good social science is that which can persuade
the most people that hold contradictory perspectives on
how the world works. Already in the well-dispersed lit-
erature on the information revolution, there are exam-
ples of monistic research designs implemented in com-
pelling and robust fashion (see among others, Anderson,
Kearnes, McFarlane, & Swanton, 2012; Balzacq & Dunn
Cavelty, 2016; Berry, 2015). Whereas empirical efforts
like those of Valeriano and Manesss (2015) rely on a se-
ries of assumptions external to the methods and data
employed in analysis, work that draws upon socio-spatial
theories and frameworks is able to nest assessment of
a given phenomenon within fixed parameters only rele-
vant to the study at hand. As a result, while opportuni-
ties for correlative findings pertaining to such phenom-
ena are lacking, there are clear pathways to thick descrip-
tion thereof.
6. Open Source Research and Challenges for the
Development of the Research Program
Given these competing approaches to knowledge gener-
ation and the organization of research programs, how
problematic are barriers to effective observation of dig-
ital dynamics for researchers? While it is possible that
individual researchers, research teams and institutions
might find access to proprietary information that allows
for unique analysis of a given phenomenon, the real-
ity is that most investigation in the cyber-security re-
search program is done—and will enduringly be done—
off the back of open source data collection.Whethermin-
ing event data from news reports and wire feeds (as in
Radford, 2016) or conducting ethnographic research into
the shape of communities and institutions (as in Sow-
ell, 2012), social scientists interested in undertakingwork
in this domain must largely do so absent the special ac-
cess conditions held by stakeholders in the domain. Aca-
demic researchers may occasionally be allowed unique
access to private data (for instance, King, Pan, & Roberts,
2013; Kostyuk & Zhukov, 2017) and are often supported
by grants that enhance the power of observation at the
level of the researcher, but they do not hold specialized
roles—as do Internet service providers, intelligence en-
tities or private cyber-security vendors, for instance—
that might enduringly allow for access to information
that could serve to bridge the attribution gap described
above. A range of promising work has been done in the
social sciences that empirically selects on either sociopo-
litical dynamics (for instance, Valeriano &Maness, 2015)
or technical details (e.g. Mezzour, Carley, & Carley, 2015)
as the basis for generalizing about a given phenomenon.
In almost all cases, however, there exist clear shortcom-
ings in the ability of researchers to validate their findings
such that inference is possible. And while some creative
solutions exist that have bridged the digital methodolog-
ical divide at the level of discrete research projects, it is
difficult to see how such challenges might be remedied
at the level of the research program.
For dualists, the specter of such an enduring orga-
nizational and validating challenge in cyber research is
particularly problematic. How research programs should
and do emerge is hotly debated by both seminal and
contemporary dualist philosophers, but the general idea
is that research programs are layered constructions of
knowledge wherein peripheral hypotheses linked with
core theses are tested in order to advance the state of a
given field (Jackson, 2008). Sometimes, hypothesis test-
ing leads to such rapid advancement in the shape of
specific knowledge that there is a revolution in general
knowledge—in the theoretical bases of a research field.
Themanner in which this occurs is the subject of classical
debate between thinkers like Kuhn and Popper. Regard-
less, the idea is roughly similar across the board and so it
is easy to see why ontological problems in work focused
on ICT and their impact dominate so completely. System-
atic barriers to the robust implementation of falsification-
based research designs are an impediment to the pro-
cess of knowledge construction. Adding to this, the cyber-
security research program is still in its infancy. The shape
of general knowledge at the heart of the research pro-
gram is unclear, suggesting that efforts to improve our
knowledge base by rejecting pre-existing theory are pre-
mature and that, moreso than is common with estab-
lished areas of scholarship, there is a strong imperative
to articulate macro-theoretical perspectives. Taken to-
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gether, the path ahead for efforts to construct an effec-
tive dualist social science research program is laden with
likely pitfalls and uncertainty.
For monists, these challenges are less severe. Again,
the monistic position is that scholars should assess ideal-
type constructions of our world with consistent ana-
lytic premises rather than simply aim to describe the
real world as a set of facts. As long as a researcher’s
premises are consistent and logically applied across re-
search in the form of a clearly delineated analytic frame-
work, good social science work is possible. The point
is simply to persuade the most people that hold con-
tradictory perspectives on how the world works. From
this point of view, objective research on and around the
cyber domain is entirely possible without specific sys-
tematic remedy to the ontological problems inherent
in observational work across the board. Indeed, some
such research is already emerging. Though it does not
generalize on global patterns of cyber conflict, Balzacq
and Dunn Cavelty’s (2016) exploration of the applica-
bility of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) demonstrates the
manner in which network functionality and control can
be shaped by fluid syntactic threats in the form of mal-
ware.2 Such work has clear value to strategic planners.
Punctuated successes like this that bridge the digital
divide are as meaningful for the research program as
would be a broad-scoped revolution in approaches to
cross-validation and data obtainment within the field.
Certainly, a monistic perspective might recognize that
any effort to advance access to the means of observing
all aspects of the domain is conducive to good social sci-
ence insofar as greater exposure to information about
the world will lead to a proliferation of world views and,
thus, incentivize the production of more compelling an-
alytic work. But lack of full observational data about the
world around us is not necessarily a hard barrier to con-
tinued development of the research program. Indeed,
even given a revolution in methods of approach to cor-
relative research, speculative investigation seems better
suited to providing scholars the means to consider the
validity of non-obvious relationships.
7. Recommendations: A Need for Community and
Collective Action
Obviously, the field of scholars interested in conducting
cyber-security research—broadly construed—is diverse
and destined to be constituted of elements that value
different approaches to knowledge construction. This is
perhaps more the case here than with other traditional
fields of study within the social science enterprise given
the degree to which the most recent information revolu-
tion has transformed the social, political and economic
substrates of world affairs in a crosscutting fashion, at-
tracting students of varied interests and research inclina-
tions. Nevertheless, I argue that there exists a set of steps
to be taken that addresses the imperatives of compet-
ing philosophical perspectives on approaches to be taken
in such research in common. Specifically, these steps
involve the construction of strong community mecha-
nisms around the research program that can both en-
courage adoption of amicro-foundational framework for
developing new dualistic research projects and expose
diverse scholarly sub-communities (and their perspec-
tives) to others in such a way that expands prospects
for what monists might call a robust social science fo-
cused on cyber-security issues. Indeed, I posit that de-
velopments akin to those suggested below are necessary
for the viability of a cross-cutting digital studies research
program specifically because knowledge construction at
the level of the program is impossible—regardless of a
given scholar’s dualistic or monistic conceptualization of
the social science enterprise in this vein—without con-
sensus and the mechanisms thereof.
Scholarly Responsibility. To some degree, the sim-
plest mechanism for advancing the research program
is quite simply continued and improved commitment
to responsible scholarly practices at the level of the
researchers and the research project. At present, the
diverse cyber-security field is a somewhat fragmented
beast insofar as best practices are not determined via
reference to the research program so much as they are
via reference to the traditional academic domains from
which individual researchers hail. This is no clearer than
with the case of standards for replication of investiga-
tory work and hypothesis testing. At least at the level
of the researcher, a voluntary commitment to adopt
in-group replication as a basic standard for publication
of evidence would help remedy the clear issue that
arises from unique proprietary access to data that can-
not be publicly provided. In essence, a commitment
to allow an independent group of collaborators not co-
investigating a given project should be common prac-
tice as a means for controlling for lack of replication op-
tions during and after the publication process (where
data from vendors, interviews, etc. are used in a cen-
tral role). Pre-publication replication would make work
more credible and would tie scholarly reputation to a
given research finding beyond what author(s) or results-
sans-data might. Secondarily, the field should adopt
standards for claiming inference from the medical and
psychology fields wherein multiple independent studies
(i.e. datasets) are employed and rated based on their
credibility (see Francis, 2012; Maxwell, Lau, & Howard,
2015). Naturally, such efforts should be supported and
bolstered via the purposive organization of research fo-
rums and conference programs around such principles of
community cross-validation and debate. Likewise, jour-
2 For a full introduction to ANT, see Latour (2005). Latour outlines ANT as both related to and a pushback against the monism described by Jackson
(2008) and others. Latour sees most social science as being overly laden with suppositions about the character of actors and objects in world affairs. In
essence, he argues for austere form of approach to understanding sociological assemblages—including security assemblages—in the world based on
a materialist view of connections that cede meaning.
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nal special editions and special conference proceedings
would do well to be planned across outlets in coordina-
tion with such forums.
Common Resources. Further, the cyber-security re-
search program should support efforts to build com-
mon resources for coordination. Particularly given that
the field largely lacks core theoretical division in the
way that traditional academic areas of focus do at this
juncture, a micro-foundational approach to the produc-
tion of knowledge—regardless of one’s perspective on
the nature of good social science—is necessary for the
construction of robust foundations for future research.
In this vein, coordination across diverse university re-
searchers, centers and counterparts in the private sector
is critical if the field is to both avoid rampant duplication
of efforts and effectively encourage commitment to new
research pathways in a timely fashion. To this end, the
community should embrace the incorporation of both
new technologies andmechanisms of cooperation found
in the natural sciences. To the latter point, inter-scholar
discussion groups like those found in the security studies
and comparative politics fields should be encouraged via
the patronage of organizing associations and full support
should be lent to an effort to build a common repository
for storing published work and relevant data. To the for-
mer point, the field would do well to consider the use of
a collaborative blockchain-based system for sharing com-
puting resources and cataloguing research interactions
in a public, transparent manner.
A Digital Studies Scholarship Cooperative. Of course,
without some kind of organizing force, much of this lies
in the realm of suggestion free from an ability to effec-
tively implement at the level of the immense commu-
nity of scholars and institutions that constitute the cyber-
security research program. I argue that such an organiz-
ing force, however, should not simply take the form of
an association that primarily organizes conferences and
provides professional resources to scholars. Rather, be-
cause of the unique methodological and coordinative
challenges facing the field, I argue that scholars would be
best served by participating in a digital studies research
cooperative wherein the sole purpose is to enhance the
clout and research prospects of the community-at-large.
Secondary to a professional association, such a coopera-
tive would be centralized only around an oversight com-
mittee of rotating membership that (given relevant re-
view) acted to vouch for scholars negotiating for pro-
prietary data access, ensured protection of such data,
allowed for robust implementation of replication stan-
dards without violation of non-disclosure agreements
and maintained the means for research/resource collab-
oration suggested above. Regardless of researcher prior-
ities, developing such a cooperative would bring a broad
set of benefits for researchers to all, not least themainte-
nance of a platform for coordinating the storage of new
knowledge and orchestrating necessary collaborations
amongst scholars undertaking related—even if method-
ologically distant—investigations.
8. Conclusion
This article has broadly sought to describe why unique
attributional and availability challenges in the diverse
research program on cyber-security are problematic. In
particular, I have sought herein to highlight the monist
perspective—an objectivity-based interpretation of the
nature of knowledge construction championed by Max
Weber—on what constitutes good social science. For
monists, the challenges inherent in trying to bridge the
digital divide in research are not, fundamentally, imped-
iments to the development of a research program as is
often seen to be the case among those of a more dual-
istic perspective on the social science enterprise. While
enhanced abilities to cross-validate technical and so-
ciopolitical observations—as well as to obtain data from
otherwise opaque stakeholders that often possess such
information—is desirable in general, it does not mean
that the research program is doomed to enduringly be on
shaky ontological ground. Rather, what is most desirable
for the research problem is an expansion of community-
supporting features of organization that will allow for
better exposure of different world views expressed in
analytic frameworks employed in research. Fortunately,
such an approach is highly compatible with the imper-
atives of the research program as dualists might artic-
ulate them. Focus on better cooperative organization
within the field stands to improve broad commitment
to research standards and encourage the development
of much-needed provision of common resources for the
scholarly community.
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